

# MODEL ANSWERS

## What is the strategic significance of Maldives as a model neighbour for India?

Maldives like most of the neighbours is important to India, but more important than other neighbours in the light of Chinese emergence and India's position in Indian Ocean.

India's relations with Maldives, except for a brief interregnum, have been excellent in all aspects: linguistic, cultural, religious and commercial. India was among the first countries to recognise Maldives in 1965. In 1988, India demonstrated its unconditional commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Maldives by lending prompt assistance to defeat the attempted overthrow of the then legitimate government. And when the Tsunami struck in 2004 or when Maldives endured a water crisis in 2014, India was the first responder in terms of humanitarian and disaster relief.

India's policy of 'Neighbourhood First' and Maldives' policy of 'India First' seem to be in absolute sync with each other and the broad bilateral ties rest on the foundation of mutual trust, understanding and sensitivity to each other's concerns.

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### *Strategic Importance*

The Republic of Maldives is arguably the most strategically important of India's neighbours. An island nation in the Indian Ocean with one of the largest exclusive economic zones in the world, it is positioned like a 'toll gate', between the western Indian Ocean chokepoints of the Gulf of Aden/Strait of Hormuz and the eastern Indian Ocean chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca on the other. Since the Indian Ocean itself is a key highway for global energy and trade flows, the importance of Maldives for international sea lanes of communication is vital.

1. Strategically speaking, Maldives archipelago comprises 1,200 coral islands and lies next to key shipping lanes which ensure uninterrupted energy supplies to countries like China, Japan and India. Important because any one who controls Maldives controls the oil lanes.
2. Since China started to sending naval ships to Indian Ocean up to Gulf of Aden on the pretext of antipiracy operations (which incidentally Chinese connived with Pirates) Maldives' significance has steadily grown and it can play a key role in controlling piracy. Any threat to Maldives has the potential to issue a threat to the control of the **choke points** in Indian Ocean.
3. India in any case needs to cooperate with Maldives in security and defence sectors, since it wants to emerge as the pre-eminent South Asian power and a 'net security provider' in the Indian Ocean region.

### *Chinese Factor*

4. China's massive economic presence in Maldives is a major concern for India. With the country now said to owe 70% of its external aid to China, Maldives has gone back, India's significance and its importance waned in the light of ouster of President Nasheed, but Maldives now is a model neighbor.

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### ***Islamic tinge to Unity and its Threats***

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6. Maldives is also a member of SAARC. It is important for India to have Maldives on board to maintain its leadership in the region.

7. Maldives has been at the forefront of Islamic radicalisation checked recently by the present Govt..

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### ***Economic Significance***

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8. India and Maldives share ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and commercial links. India was among the first to recognise Maldives after its independence in 1965 and later established its mission at Malé in 1972

9. There are 25,000 Indian nationals living in Maldives (second largest expatriate community). Indian tourists also account for close to 6% of tourists Maldives receives every year

10. India is also a preferred destination for Maldivians for education, medical treatment, recreation and business. More and more Maldivians are seeking long term visa for pursuing higher studies/ medical treatment in India.

11. Maldives offers a lot of Business opportunities for India, as the virgin pristine islands need tourism development infrastructure and other infrastructural developments related to growth as well.

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### ***Maldives relationship. A model of ties with other countries***

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The major turnaround in India's relations with Maldives and its elevation to a strategic high is a notable success story in our neighbourhood diplomacy. The following lessons are worth drawing from this exemplary success:

- Personal involvement of the PM on the Indian side and the President on the Maldivian side has been a crucial factor in the success story so far.
- The external affairs ministry deserves credit for speedy implementation and follow-up of projects and commitments made at the highest level.
- Strategic convergence between the two countries was made possible because of the policies of India First and Neighbourhood First.
- Maldives' own objectives in the Indian Ocean are not very different from our own policy of Security and Growth for All in the Region. India's strong commitment to be a net maritime security provider in the region can be dovetailed with Maldives' own desire for maritime security.
- Thanks to the people-centric projects aided by India such as capacity building, ITEC programmes and the crucial health sector, India is seen by the ordinary people of Maldives as a benevolent and friendly power. The importance of this aspect cannot be overemphasised.

**Para diplomacy has the potential to not only strengthen the federal structure of the Indian state but also radically alter the trajectory of Indian foreign policy by helping regional governments to realise their potential in the conduct of cross border relations. Critically Analyse.**

Answer:

**Paradiplomacy** introduces the idea of decentralization of political power to make regional governments prominent actors in the international sphere. In recent years, Indian states have begun playing a larger role in foreign policy than they previously did, due to the country's economic liberalization and the rising influence of regional political parties.

Para diplomacy can be employed with a **variety of aims** which can range from bringing in a decentralized dimension to international debates to internationalization of domestic issues by bringing regional issues on the global stage, promoting trade, tourism, cultural ties etc.

How it will strengthen the Federal structure?

(i) **Local Issues:** It makes space for issues to be addressed keeping local sentiments in mind. E.g. A local involvement of the **Tamil Nadu government with Sri Lanka** will be more prudent in tackling issues related to not just fishing rights for residents but also of reservations and/or remittances for refugees, and human trafficking.

(ii) **Centre-State Relations:** It improves the communication channels between two and makes one sensitise for the needs of others but at times even affects the relations. **E.g. West Bengal's Foreign Policies often affects its relations with Centre- Teesta River issue etc.**

<https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials>

<https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials>

<https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam>

(iii) **Competitive Federalism:** Gujarat has been able to substantially add to the nation's larger interests by working on economic diplomacy at the federal level by hosting the **Global Investors Summit**.

(iv) It enhances **state's administrative efficiency** by bringing in more stakeholders directly. E.g. In 2015, **MEA asked Chandrababu Naidu, to lead a high-profile delegation to China** a month before PM Modi's state visit to China.

(v) **It will give rise to sensible politics as major regional political parties will be direct party in relations.** E.g. In June 2015, PM Modi included Mamata Banerjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal in his official delegation to Bangladesh.

(vi) The **federalization of foreign policy** is a development of significant import as states are often better equipped than the Central government to undertake diplomatic measures in areas of trade, commerce, foreign direct investment, education, cultural exchanges and also outsourcing of business.

(vii) Paradiplomacy is a tool that further unifies India as it introduces **bottoms up approach in foreign policy** thereby leading to strengthened federal polity.

How it will alter the trajectory of Indian Foreign Policy?

(i) The provincial governments are often better placed to enhance diplomatic relations with other governments in their neighborhood because of geographical, cultural, historical and economic reasons. **E.g. Kerala** has vested interests in engaging in diplomatic relations with the Gulf countries as a large number of the state's residents find jobs in those countries.

(ii) India can play a vital role by providing port facilities, medical tourism and also shared international airports to a landlocked country like **Bhutan**. **E.g. West Bengal** can have more successful Para diplomatic relations with Bangladesh and Bhutan than a MEA official stationed at the country's capital.

(iii) **States like Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Tamil Nadu**, ruled by regional parties, have taken the lead in collaborating with foreign companies in managing some of their municipal services.

(iv) The **Centre encouraged border-states to establish border haats** to market local produce, to encourage trans-border trade along the traditional trade routes and such haats went a long way in encouraging local prosperity and cultural exchange.

**Paradiplomacy of Border States** poses a different problem for the Union. Due to the acrimonious legacy of Partition and the continuing border disputes with its neighbors, India has to tread the path of paradiplomacy rather cautiously. **Border management** being a complex issue, the Union government can ill afford to delegate this power to states in the name of globalization and market forces.

Way Forward:

While Para diplomacy throws up **fresh challenges** for the Indian government, the involvement of state governments in the domain of foreign policy certainly addresses the issue in greater depth. The Centre needs to come up with effective institutional mechanisms to introduce Para diplomacy in the country. The **creation of the States Division within the Ministry of External Affairs** is indicative of this new willingness to mainstream regional voices on foreign policy matters.

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## What is Hydrodiplomacy. How is India using hydrodiplomacy as a tool to secure itself from a water war.

Water is the new weapon, a weapon to destroy the world, destroy the social fabric a tool to blackmail countries into submission, a tool to extort and a means to settle scores.

A new place that will be able to exercise a domineering influence on account of having the world's greatest amount of water reservoir. This is Tibetan plateau.

Damming of rivers and the proposed river diversion schemes in Tibet come in the wake of the looming water crisis in Asia and the ability and intention of Chinese which remain open to scrutiny. Water is poised to overtake oil as the world's scarcest vital resource. China's plans for the various uses of waters of rivers originating from Tibet are intensifying the heated debate about their likely consequences for downstream nations. Already there is the talk of water wars.

Damming of rivers to regulate their flow, serious plans to divert river waters from the south to the north, increasing mining of minerals precariously close to river banks and the potential for massive pollution of river waters that flow to the rest of Asia make Tibet a pressing issue for all of Asia to take up with China.

China has started using water as a weapon, a deadly and a lethal weapon. In Tibet China is in control of waters flowing into Indian subcontinent and South East Asia. There, it has Control over Indus and its tributaries as well as Brahmaputra and its tributaries in Tibet.

Chinese strategy is to construct dams over the rivers so that it can regularize the flow of water as per its own will and use it as a weapon to bargain for it to trouble the countries. The other strategies involve creating a natural dam by blasting the river valley of rivers and then demolishing it to flood Indian territories without the danger of being blamed legally or logically.

India has a lot of concern with respect to Tibetan rivers flowing into its territory.

China's dam building overdrive is a concern because there are no bilateral or multilateral treaties on the water. India believes China's projects in the Tibetan plateau threaten to reduce river flows into India. China can turn dams, canals, irrigation systems into a political weapon to be wielded in war, or during peace to signal annoyance with a co-riparian state. Most Dangerous of all, China contemplating northward re-routing of the Yarlung Zangbo. Diversion of the Brahmaputra is an idea China does not discuss in public, because it implies devastating India's northeastern plains and Bangladesh, either with floods or reduced water flow. From a Chinese stand, it believes that dam building on the Brahmaputra helps it assert claim over Arunachal Pradesh. That adds to India's woes

Apart from Beijing's dam-building frenzy on India's periphery extends from Myanmar and Tibet to Pakistan-held Kashmir, where it is constructing the 720 MW Karot and the 1,124 MW Kohala (the largest Chinese investment under the so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor).

Thus India faces daunting challenges vis a vis its water resources. That includes lot of transnational water issues incorporating hydel power resource generation distribution and its sharing and related concerns that look camouflaged.

For example, communist-ruled Nepal's tilt towards China is apparent in its resurrection of a scrapped deal with China to build the \$2.5 billion, 1,200-megawatt (MW) Budhi-Gandaki Dam.

India therefore has to tackle it through water diplomacy, a diplomacy that does not revolve only around water sharing, but also hydel power generation.

This diplomacy can be an important tool of its regional foreign policy so as to facilitate rules-based cooperation and conflict prevention.

India has a unique riparian status: It is the only regional country that falls in all three categories — upper, middle and lower riparian. Such is India's geographical spread that it has a direct stake in all the important river basins in the region. India is potentially affected by water-related actions of upstream countries, especially China and Nepal, while its own room for manoeuvre is constricted by the treaty relationships it has with downstream Pakistan and Bangladesh on the Indus and the Ganges, respectively. Indeed, no country in Asia is more vulnerable to China's re-engineering of trans-boundary flows than India because it alone receives — directly or via rivers that flow in through Nepal — nearly half of all river waters that leave Chinese-controlled territory.

Yet hydro-diplomacy has scarcely been a major instrument of Indian foreign policy. Had India looked at water as a strategic resource and emphasised hydro-diplomacy to leverage bilateral relations, it would not have signed the one-sided Indus Waters Treaty (IWT).

The net result has been today, India's deepening water woes in lower Indus Basin have resulted in the world's second-most rapid rate of groundwater depletion in the Punjab-Haryana-Rajasthan belt after the Arabian Peninsula.

Meanwhile, China and Pakistan are employing water as a tool against India. Pakistan's water war strategy is centred on invoking the IWT's conflict-resolution provisions to internationalise any perceived disagreement with India. China's cut-off of hydrological data to India in 2017 — an action that not only breached bilateral accords but also caused preventable flood-related deaths in Assam — helped highlight how Beijing is fashioning unconventional tools of coercive diplomacy.

Modi's new, unified water power ministry aims to rectify a splintered, piecemeal approach that has compounded India's water challenges. But without institutionalised, integrated policymaking, it will not be easy to develop a holistic approach to a critical resource increasingly in short supply or to fashion an effective hydro-diplomacy that advances long-term water interests.

India must build pressure on China to abide by international norms on shared water resources. With Pakistan, there is no need for India to bend over backwards.

### **Way Ahead**

In keeping with Modi's preference for the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, or Bimstec, a forward-looking Indian diplomacy should promote multilateral cooperation on water and

hydropower resources in the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Myanmar-Nepal growth corridor. The ultimate goal should be a water and energy grid that turns Bimstec into Asia's leading economic-growth zone. India has already issued a new cross-border power trading regulation that allows any neighbour to export electricity to third countries via Indian transmission lines.

Water-rich Bhutan, Myanmar and Nepal sit on vast untapped hydropower reserves. While Nepal still imports electricity from India, the flourishing Bhutan-India relationship is underpinned by close collaboration on water and clean and affordable energy. Bhutan's hydropower exports to India have been the primary driver of what is one of the world's smallest but fastest-growing economies. From modest, environmentally friendly, run-of-river plants, Bhutan is stepping up its India collaboration with a reservoir-based, 2,585 MW project on River Sankosh — larger than any dam in India.

Water increasingly will be a critical factor in regional development. India must get its act together on hydro-diplomacy and exert stronger leadership on trans-boundary water issues.

### WHAT IS SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE? What makes it important and for what reason?

As a preemptive measure, China wants a full control over South China Sea. This is the area through which the greatest amount of traffic for India passes. Also the Chinese can think of controlling Malacca Strait from the Pacific side.

China has mastered and manipulated a dispute in South China Sea out of nothing.

China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan all have differing claims on waters and islands.

China claims almost the entire South China Sea through a 'nine-dash line', which extends into other countries' Exclusive Economic Zones (200 nautical miles area for exploitation) 15 mm barrels of oil (a sixth of the global supply) transit through the sea daily. Fears of conflict have risen after the 2012 stand-off between China and the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal.

China now building runways, army facilities on reclaimed reefs in the Spratly Islands

#### **Why is South China Sea important?**

1. On a strategic level, it's about control of the world's busiest shipping route. China is laying claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea.
2. About half the world's commercial shipping passes through the area and most nations are worried if anything goes wrong then it will cripple their economy.
3. On a geological level, it is about some of the world's most prospective seabed oil and gas deposits.
4. On a military level, it's about China's avid desire to push the US navy away from its coast. Beijing craves uncontested domain over its maritime approaches.

The US Seventh Fleet has been unchallenged ruler of the Pacific since World War Two. A fast-rising China is now challenging.

5. And on the level of global governance, it's about whether there are any rules governing countries, or whether a country can get its way through use of force.

### **China's concern**

China will continue to push the envelope in the South China Sea because controlling the waters is key to its national security strategy.

The United States will be limited in its ability to respond because of its concerns about escalation and because of China's nuclear capabilities.

Beijing will lobby Washington to keep Japan out of the dispute, but Tokyo will remain involved.

Beijing's and Washington's divergent perspectives are rooted in radically different national and regional strategies.

On the world stage, China portrays the South China Sea dispute as fundamentally a question of sovereignty. The United States, however, foregrounds concerns about freedom of navigation.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the unquestioned pre-eminent power in the Pacific Rim, assisted by its allies, most notably Japan and South Korea. Simultaneously, however, China has been emerging as a potential regional hegemon, and the South China Sea has become the most visible area of tension.

A core but often unstated component of U.S. national strategy is to maintain global superiority at sea. By controlling the seas, the United States is able to guarantee the secure movement of U.S. goods and to deploy military power worldwide. This preserves global economic activity — feeding the domestic economy — while ensuring that any threat to national security is addressed abroad before it can reach the homeland. This state of affairs is enforced by the powerful U.S. Navy, but it is undergirded by Washington's particular interpretation of international law.

In China's near seas, the U.S. global imperative comes into conflict with China's emerging regional needs. Since the early 1980s, China has undergone a transition from an insular, self-sufficient pariah state to a major exporter. This has forced Beijing to reassess its maritime risks and vulnerabilities. China is no longer able to protect its national economy without securing the maritime routes it needs to maintain trade and to feed its industrial plant.

The South China Sea is one such essential waterway, made more important by the value of the sea's fisheries and subsea resources such as natural gas. But addressing the risks of its near seas means tackling the time-consuming and costly project of building, training and deploying a stronger blue-water navy while also establishing a greater maritime buffer along the Chinese coastline. China's assertion of ownership and control in the South China Sea, coupled with liberal interpretations of its rights within its claimed exclusive economic zone, gives Beijing at least a modicum of greater security.

With QUAD India, Australia, Japan and USA a lot of future is at stake..

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**Discuss the strategic significance of Kraa Canal for China and Thailand. What have been the issues and opposition concerned?**

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**Context**

The Strait of Malacca is a major bottleneck in China's global ambitions. 80 per cent of China's oil supplies pass through the Malacca Strait, apart from forming its trade routes to the Middle East and Europe. But India's geographical position is such that it can easily block the Western side of the Strait of Malacca.

China had been eyeing to construct a 120-kilometre mega canal cutting through the isthmus of Kra in Thailand. It would have helped Beijing in solving the 'Malacca Dilemma' as it had opened the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the Strait of Malacca.

**Thai response**

Thailand, which once was the strongest ally of China in the South China Sea region, had decided to not only postpone the procurement of two submarines from China but has also put on hold the Chinese proposal for building a canal in the Bay of Bengal and replaced it with its own project.

If Thailand chooses one of three quad members interested in the project, it will be a heavy blow to China's ambitions to dominate the region.

Kraa peninsula can be engineered to make a canal.

**Concept**

The Thai Canal, also known as Kra Canal or Kra Isthmus Canal, refers to proposals for a canal that would connect the Gulf of Thailand with the Andaman Sea across the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand. It is envisaged that such a canal would improve transportation in the region, similar to the Panama Canal and Suez Canal.

The canal would provide an alternative to transit through the Straits of Malacca and shorten transit for shipments of oil to Japan and China by 1,200 km. China refers to it as part of its 21st century maritime Silk Road.

**Geography**

Several canal routes have been proposed: The original Kra Canal was envisioned as cutting through the Kra Isthmus between Ranong and Chumphon, the narrowest part of the South, a distance of about 50 kilometres. Other routes proposed include a route in southern Thailand connecting Bandon Bay near Surat Thani with Phang Nga Province. Another is across Nakhon Si Thammarat Province and Trang Province. The seemingly preferred version of the Kra Canal project would dig through Krabi, Trang, Phattalung, Nakhon Si Thammarat and Songkhla, a distance of 128 kilometres.

The Chinese planned called for construction over ten years employing roughly 30,000 workers at a cost of between US\$20–25 billion.

**Opposition to Canal**

Canal opponents have raised several objections to the construction of a canal:

- A canal will divide the country physically and pose a security risk. It is feared that a canal would separate the four southernmost provinces from the rest of Thailand and allow secessionist movements to further develop.
- Demand for transit will not meet expectations.
- The excavated soil will need to be dealt with.
- Environmental concerns
- Moreover, there will be Impact on Malaysia and Singapore. The canal would compete directly with ports in the Strait of Malacca area, including Port Klang, Tanjung Pelepas, and Singapore.
- Singapore has expressed concerns about an adverse impact on its economy from the proposed canal.

### Analyze China's position in the world from the viewpoint of REE production and the impact of various REE on the world economy.

A rare-earth element (REE) or rare-earth metal (REM), as defined by IUPAC, is one of a set of seventeen chemical elements in the periodic table, specifically the fifteen lanthanides, as well as scandium and yttrium. Scandium and yttrium are considered rare-earth elements because they tend to occur in the same ore deposits as the lanthanides and exhibit similar chemical properties.

Rare-earth elements are cerium (Ce), dysprosium (Dy), erbium (Er), europium (Eu), gadolinium (Gd), holmium (Ho), lanthanum (La), lutetium (Lu), neodymium (Nd), praseodymium (Pr), promethium (Pm), samarium (Sm), scandium (Sc), terbium (Tb), thulium (Tm), ytterbium (Yb) and yttrium (Y).

Today, the Indian and South African deposits still produce some rare-earth concentrates, but they are dwarfed by the scale of Chinese production. In 2010, China produced over 95% of the world's rare-earth supply, mostly in Inner Mongolia, although it had only 37% of proven reserves;

Specifically, China has announced regulations on exports and a crackdown on smuggling. China announced plans to reduce its export quota to 35,000 tons per year in 2010–2015 to conserve scarce resources and protect the environment. China "further wants to reduce quotas for rare[-]earth exports by 30 percent at most next year to protect the precious metals from over-exploitation". China further announced the halt in production of three of its eight major rare-earth mines, responsible for almost 40% of China's total rare-earth production. These restrictions have damaged industries in other countries and forced producers of rare-earth products to relocate their operations to China.

As a result of the increased demand and tightening restrictions on exports of the metals from China, some countries are stockpiling rare-earth resources. Searches for alternative sources in Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Africa, Tanzania, Greenland, and the United States are ongoing. Mines in these countries were closed when China undercut world prices in the 1990s, and it will take a few years to restart production as there are many barriers to entry. One example is the

Mountain Pass mine in California, which announced its resumption of operations on a start-up basis on August 27, 2012. Other significant sites under development outside of China include the Nolans Project in Central Australia, the remote Hoidas Lake project in northern Canada, and the Mount Weld project in Australia. The Hoidas Lake project has the potential to supply about 10% of the \$1 billion of REE consumption that occurs in North America every year. Vietnam signed an agreement in October 2010 to supply Japan with rare earths from its northwestern Lai Châu Province.

Due to the rising prices of rare earths, extraction of these oxides has become economically viable. The country currently exports around 3,000 tonnes per year, representing around 2% of world production. Similar resources are suspected in the western United States, where gold rush-era mines are believed to have discarded large amounts of rare earths, because they had no value at the time.

Nuclear reprocessing is another potential source of rare earth or any other elements. Nuclear fission of uranium or plutonium produces a full range of elements, including all their isotopes. However, due to the radioactivity of many of these isotopes, it is unlikely that extracting them from the mixture can be done safely and economically

## India's Maritime challenges are associated with the security and Governance of Indian Ocean, the threats to the littoral countries and the problems of Indian Navy.

India's densely crowded littorals have a higher density of human habitation than the global trend.

### Governance and Security

Good Governance and social economic development nurtures a vital stake of India's citizenry the vital synergies as primary stakeholders in combating crime and terrorism. Heavy handed security measures and draconian legislations have no appeal for a discounted populace. Human security form human development is the derivative of good governance yielding comprehensive security.

India crafts its operational response as a joint operations approach that would brings in the Navy and Coast Guard as the prime enables linking with the Air Force and civilian administration at the central and state levels.

Joint operations go by nodal agency that would shape and lead the response mechanism. Littoral-maritime operations demand a single maritime agency that coordinates the coastal and off shore security.

A rising India should adeptly balance the imperatives of governance and security on one hand while accentuating growth and stability.

### Challenges to Littorals

- o India faces a perilous vulnerability of its littoral and the Exclusive Economic Zone fraught with a wide-spectrum of maritime asymmetric as asymmetric threats of increasing incidence of piracy, maritime terrorism, narcotics and light, small arms smuggling – This has been the dense maritime domain of both of native and alien maritime activity with little governance and regulation;
- o India's second maritime – littoral challenge and nightmare is the security of India's littoral and the security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) that abounds the Indian peninsula. Shipping in this domain ranges from fishing trawlers to supertankers and super-container ships. The intense shipping and poaching of foreign trawlers in India's littorals and the EEZ have wrecked the delicate environmental balance of the diversified and rich marine life and resources of the Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean-Bay of Bengal areas.
- o India's third maritime – littoral challenge and threat is the established nexus between organised crime in the hinterland with terror groups in the proximity of India's borders and boundaries with Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh and importantly from Pakistan (the recent Mumbai terror attacks) have a evidently revealed. The crime syndicates have used the external linkages in the sea-smuggling of narcotics, small arms, explosives to be used in the various criminal are the staging points for the long chain of links in the smuggling process.
- o India's fourth peril in its maritime-littoral corridors is the trafficking of weapons of mass destructions in its components, subassemblies etc. Earlier such merchandise have often been in maritime transit connecting Pakistan from China and North Korea.
- o India's fifth clear and present danger is the daunting weakness in the Maritime domain awareness due to the vast littoral territory and the dense populations in these areas.

#### Challenges to rise of Indian naval power

Naval power had always been technology intensive and most innovative like aerospace power. Waves of technology revolutions have rendered obsolescent the concepts, doctrines, operations and the hardware of the past era.

Four cardinal challenges stand out for India.

1. The pace of platform buildup outpaces by the platform ageing of the current inventory-therefore the order of battle of the fleet is constantly under flux with falling numbers. Although considerable service-life-extension-programs have gone into the platforms with hybridization of technology, these platforms are now coming to an end of their immensely useful operational life. The imperatives for newer platforms on emerging technology templates require urgency. However, the addition of platforms to the ratio of retirement has- not been sufficient in numbers.
2. Secondly, the complexity and diversity of missions have been increasing stressing the existing fleets into missions often beyond their capacity.
3. Thirdly, the pace of Revolution in Military Affairs or even specifically the Revolution in Naval Affairs produces new synergies in technology, doctrines and operations resulting in new templates of naval platforms, organizational and operational complexity.

4. The operational reputation of a navy is often intact unless challenged by a rising challenger or a new wave of technology and weaponry that may reduce the robustness of an established navy by inflicting a shocking defeat.
5. The pace of the plan modernization and the strategic alliances that it is building with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka for access and basing engages the Navy into inevitable regional overdrive to sustain and leverage its power and domain. It demands the Indian Navy the buildup of capacities in organizational, order of battle and operational wherewithal that would be able to develop a strong forward presence in the Strait of Malacca-South China Sea all the way to the East Pacific as a counterpoise to the Chinese maritime access building.